The Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun’s prolegomena to history, is an attempt to get at the “inner meaning of history” (p. 5). As such, Khaldun devotes his energies to explaining the evolution and origin of political and social organizations, which he considers the proper objects of historical investigation (p. 35). This quest “involves speculation and an attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes and origins of existing things and a deep knowledge of the how and why of events” (p. 5). These, Khaldun feels, are issues that earlier histories have ignored. A lack of critical thinking is to blame for the overall failure of most historical tracts.
Throughout this sprawling and encyclopedic work, Khaldun criticizes past histories, which contain much information that is “remote from the truth. It is rooted in baseless and erroneous assumptions.” (p. 15) He also objects that history is frequently used for purposes of partisanship and that too often one finds the history of a specific dynasty, and that history is merely self-serving, for the purpose of glorification; in this, most histories are too narrow to be considered universal. Additionally, he contends that the character of a given historian can make him an unreliable authority.
Khaldun lambastes historians who “do not care to consider the factual proofs and circumstantial evidence that require us to recognize that the contrary [to what they are saying] is true” (p. 23) In order for history to become a true science, historians must start applying their faculties or reason and judgment to the evaluation of historical data.
After discussing all theses problems, Khaldun explains the task of his book, which stands as a corrective to previous historiography. ”In this book I lifted the veil from conditions as they arose in the various generations. I arranged it methodically in chapters dealing with historical facts and reflections. In it I showed how and why dynasties and civilization originated” (p. 7). Concerning a new method of doing history, he prescribes “numerous sources and much varied knowledge. It also requires a good speculative mind and thoroughness, which lead the historian to the true and keep him from slips and errors.” (p. 11)
Khaldun’s chief innovation is in producing a guidebook for future historians; he therefore feels justified in calling his work “an exhaustive history of the world," Underscoring this notion is the fact that he dubs the book “A Book of Lessons,” rather than “A Book of Facts.” As he writes, “[The Muqaddimah] turns out to be a vessel for philosophy, a receptacle for historical knowledge.” (p. 9) Khaldun is highly aware of the fundamental novelty of what he’s doing, and calls it “an entirely original science.” (p. 39)
What, in fact, accounts for the newness of what he’s doing is the way in which he allows his theory of knowledge to guide his theory of history. His concern for the method of historical thinking as directly related to mankind’s capacity for critical thinking is seen in his notion of a “yardstick,” to correct the mistakes of past historians and prevent those of future ones.
[T]he normative method for distinguishing right from wrong in historical information on the grounds of inherent possibility of absurdity is to investigate human social organization, which is identical with civilization. We must distinguish between the conditions that attach themselves to the essence of civilization as required by its very nature; the things that are accidental and cannot be counted on; and the things that cannot possibly attach themselves to it…We shall have a sound yardstick with the help of which historians may find the path of truth and correctness where their reports are concerned. (p.38)
This view is reinforced by what he says about the mental abilities and types of knowledge historians must have.
“[T]he scholar in this field needs to know the principles of politics, the nature of things and the differences among nations, places and periods with regard to ways of life, character qualities, customs, sects, schools, and everything else. …His goal must be to have complete knowledge of the reasons for every happening, and to be acquainted with the origin of every event. Then he must check transmitted information with the basic principles he knows.” (p. 24)
Motivating Ibn Khaldun’s exploration of the inner workings of history is his view of human knowledge as a gift from God to mankind. But while he exalts human knowledge as capable of deriving philosophical systems of gnosis (in this case, history), he constantly reminds of the restricted scope of our understanding: For instance, when he quotes from the Koran, “God knows better. “And you were given but little knowledge” (p. 40). Among the things of which we can have no knowledge is the notion of “cause.” In connection with this, Khaldun actually admonishes us not to speculate on the nature of cause, lest it lead to heresy. (p. 249 – 250)
God has given mortals but little knowledge which we can in turn use to derive a system of guidelines to approach history with greater accuracy. With the understanding as our guide, we run less the danger of giving ourselves over to superstition and prejudices. While the facts of history will never be wholly accessible to us (due to the limited scope of our understanding), it is within out power to derive the proper way of doing history. Thus we find that Khaldun’s theory of human knowledge stands as the strong motivating principle for the creation of a system of historiography.
So now let us now inquire after the features of human thought that enable us to do history correctly. According to Khaldun, our intellect is not merely what distinguishes us from beasts, and enables us to form social organizations (x, 42). Rather, what he calls the “speculative instinct” allows us to make sense of existence through perceiving and apperceiving. As he writes, “[Speculative Instinct] consists of both perceptions and apperceptions…The end of the process is to be provided with the perception of existence as it is , with its various genera, differences, reasons and causes. By thinking about these things, man achieves perfection in his reality and becomes pure intellect and perceptive soul. This is the meaning of human reality” (p. 334). The implication here is that “intellecting” is somewhat on par with godliness as it can lead to “perfection.”
Lest we get too enthusiastic about the empowered capacities of our reason, Khaldun reminds us time and again of our fallibility (““God is the ultimate repository of all knowledge. Man is weak and deficient”) (p. 30). He is careful never to put human reason on par with divine revelation. All objects of historical knowledge require outside verification, in marked contrast with the Koran, which “is its own proof” (p. 73). Khaldun’s insistence on constant verification is geared toward making us aware of the gulf between divine revelation and the human intellect. That said, the notion that we can derive meaning in life through “perceiving and apperceiving” implies a link between human understanding and divine wisdom. We clearly see Khaldun agreeing with the idea that there is a prophetic element to all human reason when he writes, “We…were inspired by God. He led us to a science whose truth we ruthlessly set forth.” Any success that he meets in regards to producing a sound historical tract “is due to divine guidance.” (p. 42)
As concerns the functioning of the human mind, Khaldun connects the intellect’s quest for meaning with religious strivings.
[The soul] wants to be free from the grip of (the lower human) powers and the human kind of preparedness. It wants to proceed to active intellection by assimilating itself to the highest spiritual group (that of the angels), and to get into the first order of the spiritualia by perceiving them without the help of bodily organs…It exchanges all humanity and human spirituality for angelicality of the highest stage, without the help of any acquired faculty but by virtue of a primary natural disposition that God has placed in it.
Khaldun’s insistence on the realm of human intellect as connected to the divine is further fortified when we writes, “[T]he world of the intellect and the spirits is shared by us with the angels, whose essences are of the same kind as the essences of that world.” (p. 338)
Despite this link between the spiritual and the intellectual, there remain many limitations to what our minds can derive, just as there are many limitations on what can be derived through prophecy. Khaldun remains as skeptical of the supernatural element of prophecy as he is of the dubious methods employed by earlier historians. As he writes, “All [the] ways of perceiving the supernatural are based upon no proof, and are not verifiable” (89). Elsewhere he writes, “Things of the future belong to the supernatural and cannot be known unless the causes for their happening are known and we have trustworthy information about it” (p. 89).
This discussion of prophecy and its limitations underscore the reasons why we can never get a fully sound account of history. The proper way to go about doing history is to devote our powers of thinking and reasoning - powers that have a link to prophecy – to our best efforts. Since the human intellect is limited, all wisdom comes through the grace of God. As we can never get at the fundamental causes of things, the most effective way to go about historicizing is to turn our powers of reasoning to examine critically what historical knowledge we have so we have a “yardstick” for future generations of historians. This yardstick will do more than instruct us how to do history; in the quest for spiritual meaning that Ibn Khaldun has made of history, its implementation can aid one to “perfection in his reality.”
0 comments:
Post a Comment